Re: Proposed patch for key managment - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Bruce Momjian
Subject Re: Proposed patch for key managment
Date
Msg-id 20201210184939.GC13515@momjian.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Proposed patch for key managment  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
List pgsql-hackers
On Wed, Dec  9, 2020 at 05:18:37PM -0500, Stephen Frost wrote:
> Greetings,
> 
> * Daniel Gustafsson (daniel@yesql.se) wrote:
> > > On 2 Dec 2020, at 22:38, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
> > > Attached is a patch for key management, which will eventually be part of
> > > cluster file encryption (CFE), called TDE (Transparent Data Encryption)
> > > by Oracle.
> > 
> > The attackvector protected against seems to be operating systems users
> > (*without* any legitimate database access) gaining access to the data files.
> 
> That isn't the only attack vector that this addresses (though it is one
> that this is envisioned to help with- to wit, someone rsync'ing the DB
> directory).  TDE also helps with traditional data at rest requirements,
> in environments where you don't trust the storage layer to handle that
> (for whatever reason), and it's at least imagined that backups with
> pg_basebackup would also be encrypted, helping protect against backup
> theft.
> 
> There's, further, certainly no shortage of folks asking for this.

Can we flesh this out more in the docs?  Any idea on wording compared to
what I have?

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        https://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             https://enterprisedb.com

  The usefulness of a cup is in its emptiness, Bruce Lee




pgsql-hackers by date:

Previous
From: "Bossart, Nathan"
Date:
Subject: pg_waldump error message fix
Next
From: Stephen Frost
Date:
Subject: Re: Autovacuum worker doesn't immediately exit on postmaster death