Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 12:04:25PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> I've re-considered the design of TDE feature based on the discussion
> so far. The one of the main open question is the granular of
> encryption objects: cluster encryption or more-granular-than-cluster
> encryption. The followings describe about the new TDE design when we
> choose table-level encryption or something-new-group-level encryption.
> 
> General
> ========
> We will use AES and support both AES-128 and AES-256. User can specify
> the new initdb option something like --aes-128 or --aes-256 to enable
> encryption and must specify --encryption-key-passphrase-command along
> with. (I guess we also require openssl library.) If these options are
> specified, we write the key length to the control file and derive the
> KEK and generate MDEK during initdb. wal_log_hints will be enabled
> automatically in encryption mode, like we do for checksum mode,

Agreed.  pg_control will store the none/AES128/AES256 indicator.

> Key Management
> ==============
> We will use 3-tier key architecture as Joe proposed.
> 
>   1. A master key encryption key (KEK): this is the ley supplied by the
>      database admin using something akin to ssl_passphrase_command
> 
>   2. A master data encryption key (MDEK): this is a generated key using a
>      cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator. It is
>      encrypted using the KEK, probably with Key Wrap (KW):
>      or maybe better Key Wrap with Padding (KWP):
> 
>   3a. Per table data encryption keys (TDEK): use MDEK and HKDF to generate
>       table specific keys.

What is the value of a per-table encryption key?  How is HKDF derived?
Are we still unclear if the 68GB limit is per encryption key or per
encryption key/IV combination?
 
>   3b. WAL data encryption keys (WDEK):  Similarly use MDEK and a HKDF to
>       generate new keys when needed for WAL.
> 
> We store MDEK to the plain file (say global/pgkey) after encrypted
> with the KEK. I might want to store the hash of passphrase of the KEK
> in order to verify the correctness of the given passphrase. However we
> don't need to store TDEK and WDEK as we can derive them as needed. The
> key file can be read by both backend processes and front-end tools.

Yes, we need to verify the pass phrase.

> When postmaster startup, it reads the key file and decrypts MDEK and
> derive WDEK using key id for WDEK. WDEK is loaded to the key hash map
> (keyid -> key) on the shared memory. Also we derive TDEK as needed
> when reading tables or indexes and add it to the key hash map as well
> if not exists.
> 
> Buffer Encryption
> ==============
> We will use AES-CBC for buffer encryption. We will add key id (4byte)

I think we might want to use CTR for this, and will post after this.

> to after the pd_lsn(8byte) in PageHeaderData and we will not encrypt
> first 16 byte of each pages so the LSN and key id can be used. We can
> store an invalid key id to tell us that the table is not encrypted.
> There two benefits of storing key id to the page header: offline tools
> can get key id (and know the table is encrypted or not) and it's
> helpful for online rekey in the future.

I don't remember anyone suggesting different keys for different tables. 
How would this even be managed by the user?

> I've considered to store IV and key id to a new fork but I felt that
> it is complex because we will always need to have the fork on the
> shared buffer when any pages of its main fork is written to the disk.
> If almost buffers of the shared buffers are dirtied and theirs new
> forks are not  loaded to the shared buffer, we might need to load the
> new fork and write the page to the disk and then evict some pages,
> over and over.
> 
> We will use (page lsn, page number) to create a nonce. IVs are created
> by encrypting the nonce with its TDEK.

Agreed.

> WAL Encryption
> =============
> We will use AES-CTR for WAL encryption and encrypt each WAL pages with WDEK.
> 
> We will use WAL segment number to create a nonce. Similar to buffer
> encryption, IVs are created using by the nonce and WDEK.

Yes.  If there is concern about collision of table/index and WAL IVs, we
can add a constant to the two uses, as Joe Conway mentioned.

> If we want to support enabling or disabling encryption after initdb we
> might want to have key id in the WAL page header.
> 
> Front-end Tool Support
> ==================
> We will add --encryption-key-passphrase-command option to the
> front-end tools that read database files or WAL segment files directly.
> They can get KEK via --encryption-key-passphrase-command and get MDEK
> by reading the key file. Also they can know the key length by checking
> the control file. Since they can derive TDEK using by key id stored in
> the page header they can decrypt database files. Similarly, they also
> can decrypt WAL as they can know the key id of WDEK.
>
> Master Key Rotation
> ================
> We will support new command-line tool that rotates the master key
> offline. It accepts --old-encryption-key-passphrase-command option and
> --new-encryption-key-passphrase-command to get old KEK and new KEK
> respectively. It decrypt MDEK with the old key and encrypt it with
> the new key.

That handles changing the passphrase, but what about rotating the
encryption key?  Don't we want to support that, at least in offline
mode?

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

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