On Fri, Jul 5, 2019 at 04:24:54PM -0400, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
> On 2019-Jul-05, Bruce Momjian wrote:
>
> > Uh, well, you have the WAL record, and you want to write it to an 8k
> > page. You have to read the 8k page from disk into shared buffers, and
> > you have to decrypt the 8k page to do that, right? We aren't going to
> > store 8k pages encrypted in shared buffers, right?
>
> Oh, is that the idea? I was kinda assuming that the data was kept
> as-stored in shared buffers, ie. it would be decrypted on access, not on
> read from disk. The system seems very prone to leakage if you have it
> decrypted in shared memory.
Well, the overhead of decrypting on every access will make the slowdown
huge, and I don't know what security value that would have. I am not
sure what security value TDE itself has, but I think encrypting shared
buffer contents has even less.
> If you keep it unencrypted in shared_buffers, you'd require WAL replay
> and checkpointer to have every single key in the system. That sounds
> nightmarish -- a single user can create a table, hide the key and block
> WAL replay and checkpointing for the whole system.
Yep, bingo!
> I haven't read the whole thread, sorry about that -- maybe these points
> have already been discussed.
>
> > Also, that assumes that we are only encrypting the WAL payload, and not
> > the relation oids or other header information, which I think is a
> > mistake because it will lead to information leakage.
>
> Well, that was part of my question. Why do you care to encrypt metadata
> such as the relation OID (or really relfilenode)? Yes, I was assuming
> that only the WAL payload is encrypted.
Well, you would need to decide what WAL information needs to be secured.
Is the fact an insert was performed on a table a security issue?
Depends on your risks. My point is that almost anything you do beyond
cluster-level encryption either adds complexity that is bug-prone or
fragile, or adds unacceptable overhead, or leaks security information.
--
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us
EnterpriseDB http://enterprisedb.com
+ As you are, so once was I. As I am, so you will be. +
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