Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Bruce Momjian
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id 20190616184823.us3tuaqkx2kwtrm7@momjian.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>)
Responses Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
List pgsql-hackers
On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 12:42:55PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> On 6/16/19 9:45 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > On Sun, Jun 16, 2019 at 07:07:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> >> In any case it doesn't address my first point, which is limiting the
> >> volume encrypted with the same key. Another valid reason is you might
> >> have data at varying sensitivity levels and prefer different keys be
> >> used for each level.
> > 
> > That seems quite complex.
> 
> 
> How? It is no more complex than encrypting at the tablespace level
> already gives you - in that case you get this property for free if you
> care to use it.

All keys used to encrypt WAL data must be unlocked at all times or crash
recovery, PITR, and replication will not stop when it hits a locked key.
Given that, how much value is there in allowing a key per tablespace?

I don't see how this is better than telling users they have to create a
separate cluster per key.

-- 
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://enterprisedb.com

+ As you are, so once was I.  As I am, so you will be. +
+                      Ancient Roman grave inscription +



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