Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Nico Williams
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id 20180620222842.GG4200@localhost
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com>)
Responses Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
List pgsql-hackers
On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 06:19:40PM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> On 06/20/2018 05:12 PM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 11:06:20AM -0400, Joe Conway wrote:
> > Even if they are encrypted with the same key, they use different
> > initialization vectors that are stored inside the encrypted payload, so
> > you really can't identify much except the length, as Robert stated.

Definitely use different IVs, and don't reuse them (or use cipher modes
where IV reuse is not fatal).

> The more you encrypt with a single key, the more fuel you give to the
> person trying to solve for the key with cryptanalysis.

With modern 128-bit block ciphers in modern cipher modes you'd have to
encrypt enough data to make this not a problem.  On the other hand,
you'll still have other reasons to do key rotation.  Key rotation
ultimately means re-encrypting everything.  Getting all of this right is
very difficult.

So again, what's the threat model?  Because if it's sysadmins/DBAs
you're afraid of, there are better things to do.

Nico
-- 


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