Tom Lane wrote:
> "Robert Haas" <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> > I think you have to resign yourself to the fact that a user who can
> > see only a subset of the rows in a table may very well see apparent
> > foreign-key violations. But so what?
>
> So you're leaking information about the rows that they're not supposed
> to be able to see. This is not what I would call national-security-grade
> information hiding --- leastwise *I* certainly wouldn't store nuclear
> weapon design information in such a database. The people that the NSA
> wants to defend against are more than smart enough, and persistent
> enough, to extract information through such loopholes.
>
> I can't escape the lurking suspicion that some bright folk inside the
> NSA have spent years thinking about this and have come up with some
> reasonably self-consistent definition of row hiding in a SQL database.
> But have they published it where we can find it?
I am confused how knowing that a sequence number used for a primary key
exists or doesn't exist is leaking _meaningful_ information. People
might know the sequence number exists, but how is that information
useful. Now, if natural keys are used, that is a different story.
I am, of course, supportive of digging deeper to find the best possible
behavior. I am also supportive of making row-level security an
SQL-level feature that can be used beyond SE-Linux, and will allow the
feature to be tested on all platforms.
-- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB
http://enterprisedb.com
+ If your life is a hard drive, Christ can be your backup. +
