All right, I give up. I guess no one seems to want to admit this is a
bad security policy, or accurately document it. Does that make it an
easter egg?
On Thu, Jul 20, 2006 at 01:59:43PM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote:
>
> OK, text again updated:
>
> For schemas, allows access to objects contained in the specified
> schema (assuming that the objects' own privilege requirements are
> also met). Essentially this allows the grantee to <quote>look up</>
> objects within the schema. Without this permission, it is still
> possible to see the object names, e.g. by querying the system tables.
> Also, after revoking this permission, existing backends might have
> statements that have previously performed this lookup, so this is not
> a completely secure way to prevent object access.
