Kerberos principal to dbuser mapping - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Daniel
Subject Kerberos principal to dbuser mapping
Date
Msg-id 20020515124332.53313.qmail@web21504.mail.yahoo.com
Whole thread Raw
Responses Re: Kerberos principal to dbuser mapping  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
List pgsql-hackers
The current implementation of the kerberos 5
authentification in backend/libpq/auth.c truncates the
principal after the first '/' or failing that, after
the first '@', assuming the result to be the database
username. This implicitly allows crossrealm
autentification which is not good in many instances.
Even more seriously, it discards parts following any
'/' which is definatelly very bad in many instances.

This is not satisfactory for some (I would think most)
applications. A solution to this would be mapping
kerberos principals to usernames in the database. (As
e.g ~username/.k5login determines which principals are
authorized to login as username.) Idealy this mapping
table should be a system table in the database (and
not a specialized file like the current implementation
of pg_ident.conf). Is this a stupid idea? Any
comments?

I do have a few my questions regarding an
implementation of this.

Is there any existing way of making queries from
postmaster (other than setting up a client connection
from it)?

Is there a reason pg_ident.conf and pg_hba.conf are
files rather than tables?

Is there any reason not doing authentification of both
the client and the server?

Grateful for answers and comments
Daniel


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