> Probably the way to attack this would be to combine MD5 and this double
> password-munging algorithm as a new authentication protocol type to add
> to the ones we already support. That way old clients don't have to be
> updated instantly.
Not sure that will work because once we use md5 on the server side for
pg_shadow, we have to be able to do md5 on the client, I think, for
crypting because the md5 has to be done _before_ the random salt crypt.
>
> OTOH, if the password stored in pg_shadow is MD5-encrypted, then we lose
> the ability to support the old crypt-based auth method, don't we?
Yes.
> Old clients could be successfully authenticated with cleartext password
> challenge (server MD5's the transmitted password and compares to
> pg_shadow), but we couldn't do anything with a crypt()-encrypted
> password. Is that enough reason to stay with crypt() as the underlying
> hashing engine? Maybe not, but we gotta consider the tradeoffs...
Not sure.
-- Bruce Momjian | http://www.op.net/~candle pgman@candle.pha.pa.us | (610)
853-3000+ If your life is a hard drive, | 830 Blythe Avenue + Christ can be your backup. | Drexel Hill,
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