Re: Application name patch - v2 - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Pavel Stehule
Subject Re: Application name patch - v2
Date
Msg-id 162867790910190938l2dad5360j3b9d27e8d298ff5@mail.gmail.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: Application name patch - v2  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
List pgsql-hackers
2009/10/19 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>:
> * Pavel Stehule (pavel.stehule@gmail.com) wrote:
>> 2009/10/19 Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>:
>> > * Pavel Stehule (pavel.stehule@gmail.com) wrote:
>> >> Superuser permission could not be a problem. Simple security definer
>> >> function can do it.
>> >
>> > Then you've defeated the point of making it superuser-only.
>>
>> no. Because when I write security definer function, then I explicitly
>> allow an writing for some roles. When I don't write this function,
>> then GUC is secure.
>
> And what happens when those 'some roles' are used by broken
> applications?  You don't get to say "make it superuser only" and then
> turn around and tell people to hack around the fact that it's superuser
> only to be able to use it.  That's not a solution.

You don't understand me. When I would to have a secure environment,
then I don't write this function. So there will not be a posibility to
change application name from session.

Pavel

>
>        Stephen
>
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