Interesting CERT advisory - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Mike Mascari
Subject Interesting CERT advisory
Date
Msg-id 3A5CFA26.359DE1B5@mascari.com
Whole thread Raw
List pgsql-hackers
FYI,


CERT Advisory CA-2001-01 Interbase Server Contains
Compiled-in Back Door
Account
  Original release date: January 10, 2001  Last revised: --  Source: CERT/CC
  A complete revision history is at the end of this file.

Systems Affected
    * Borland/Inprise Interbase 4.x and 5.x    * Open source Interbase 6.0 and 6.01    * Open source Firebird 0.9-3 and
earlier

Overview
  Interbase is an open source database package that had
previously been  distributed in a closed source fashion by
Borland/Inprise. Both the  open and closed source verisions of the Interbase server
contain a  compiled-in back door account with a known password.

I. Description
  Interbase is an open source database package that is
distributed by  Borland/Inprise at http://www.borland.com/interbase/ and
on  SourceForge. The Firebird Project, an alternate Interbase
package, is  also distributed on SourceForge. The Interbase server for
both  distributions contains a compiled-in back door account
with a fixed,  easily located plaintext password. The password and
account are  contained in source code and binaries previously made
available at the  following sites:
         http://www.borland.com/interbase/         http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase
http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird        http://firebird.sourceforge.net         http://www.ibphoenix.com
http://www.interbase2000.com
 
  This back door allows any local user or remote user able
to access  port 3050/tcp [gds_db] to manipulate any database object
on the  system. This includes the ability to install trapdoors or
other trojan  horse software in the form of stored procedures. In
addition, if the  database software is running with root privileges, then
any file on  the server's file system can be overwritten, possibly
leading to  execution of arbitrary commands as root.
  This vulnerability was not introduced by unauthorized
modifications to  the original vendor's source. It was introduced by
maintainers of the  code within Borland. The back door account password
cannot be changed  using normal operational commands, nor can the account be
deleted from  existing vulnerable servers [see References].
  This vulnerability has been assigned the identifier
CAN-2001-0008 by  the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) group:
        
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2001-0008
  The CERT/CC has not received reports of this back door
being exploited  at the current time. We do recommend, however, that all
affected sites  and redistributors of Interbase products or services
follow the  recommendations suggested in Section III, as soon as
possible due to  the seriousness of this issue.

II. Impact
  Any local user or remote user able to access port
3050/tcp [gds_db]  can manipulate any database object on the system. This
includes the  ability to install trapdoors or other trojan horse
software in the  form of stored procedures. In addition, if the database
software is  running with root privileges, then any file on the
server's file  system can be overwritten, possibly leading to execution
of arbitrary  commands as root.

III. Solution

Apply a vendor-supplied patch
  Both Borland and The Firebird Project on SourceForge have
published  fixes for this problem. Appendix A contains information
provided by  vendors supplying these fixes. We will update the
appendix as we  receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's
name, the  CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact
your vendor  directly.
  Users who are more comfortable making their own changes
in source code  may find the new code available on SourceForge useful as
well:
         http://sourceforge.net/projects/interbase         http://sourceforge.net/projects/firebird

Block access to port 3050/tcp
  This will not, however, prevent local users or users
within a  firewall's adminstrative boundary from accessing the back
door  account. In addition, the port the Interbase server
listens on may be  changed dynamically at startup.

Appendix A. Vendor Information

Borland
  Please see:
         http://www.borland.com/interbase/

IBPhoenix
  The Firebird project uncovered serious security problems
with  InterBase. The problems are fixed in Firebird build 0.9.4
for all  platforms. If you are running either InterBase V6 or
Firebird 0.9.3,  you should upgrade to Firebird 0.9.4.
  These security holes affect all version of InterBase
shipped since  1994, on all platforms.
  For those who can not upgrade, Jim Starkey developed a
patch program  that will correct the more serious problems in any
version of  InterBase on any platform. IBPhoenix chose to release the
program  without charge, given the nature of the problem and our
relationship  to the community.
  At the moment, name service is not set up to the machine
that is  hosting the patch, so you will have to use the IP number
both for the  initial contact and for the ftp download.
  To start, point your browser at
         http://firebird.ibphoenix.com/

Apple
  The referenced database package is not packaged with Mac
OS X or Mac  OS X Server.

Fujitsu
  Fujitsu's UXP/V operating system is not affected by this
problem  because we don't support the relevant database.

References
   1. VU#247371: Borland/Inprise Interbase SQL database
server contains      backdoor superuser account with known password
CERT/CC,      01/10/2001, https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/247371   
_________________________________________________________________
  Author: This document was written by Jeffrey S Havrilla.
Feedback on  this advisory is appreciated. 
______________________________________________________________________
  This document is available from:  http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-01.html 
______________________________________________________________________

CERT/CC Contact Information
  Email: cert@cert.org         Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)         Fax: +1 412-268-6989         Postal
address:        CERT Coordination Center         Software Engineering Institute         Carnegie Mellon University
  Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890         U.S.A.
 
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Getting security information
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______________________________________________________________________
  NO WARRANTY  Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and
the Software  Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis.
Carnegie  Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either
expressed or  implied as to any matter including, but not limited to,
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_________________________________________________________________
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  Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.


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