On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 10:14:54AM -0400, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 04:57:18PM -0500, Nico Williams wrote:
> > Client-side crypto is hard to do well and still get decent performance.
> > So on the whole I think that crypto is a poor fit for the DBAs-are-the-
> > threat threat model. It's better to reduce the number of DBAs/sysadmins
> > and audit all privileged (and, for good measure, unprivileged) access.
>
> Yeah, kind of. There is the value of preventing accidental viewing of
> the data by the DBA, and of course WAL and backup encryption are nice.
One generally does not use crypto to prevent "accidental" viewing of
plaintext, but to provide real security relative to specific threats.
If you stop at encrypting values with no integrity protection for the
PKs, and no binding to TX IDs and such, you will indeed protect against
accidental viewing of the plaintext, but not against a determined
malicious insider.
Is that worthwhile? Remember: you'll have to reduce and audit sysadmin
& DBA access anyways.
There is also the risk that users won't understand the limitations of
this sort of encryption feature and might get a false sense of security
from [mis]using it.
I'd want documentation to make it absolutely clear that such a feature
is only meant to reduce the risk of accidental viewing of plaintext by
DBAs and not a real security feature.
Nico
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