Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"? - Mailing list pgsql-general

From Adrian Klaver
Subject Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"?
Date
Msg-id e26681b8-695d-45d4-9359-af12ce33dcfe@aklaver.com
Whole thread
In response to Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"?  (Thiemo Kellner <thiemo@gelassene-pferde.biz>)
Responses Re: Why is materialized view creation a "security-restricted operation"?
List pgsql-general
On 10/4/26 12:27 PM, Thiemo Kellner wrote:
> Hi
> 
> Giving my two dimes. I apologise if some else has given it already. And 
> it is quite an operations point of view and mostly based on Oracle. To 
> the best of my knowledge, it applies to Postgres even more.
> 
> The data of DB temp tables are not visible outside of the session that 
> has put it in. In the case of trying to find the problem of code of 
> functions storing intermediary results, they are just not visible for 
> the investigator such that one has to do all the steps manually to 
> detect the point where things go wrong. In my opinion a real pita.

I am not quite following the above.

Do you mean:

1) Not having access to the function code ?

2) Having access to function code, but not the source of data?




> 
> Cheers
> 
> Thiemo


-- 
Adrian Klaver
adrian.klaver@aklaver.com



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