On Tue, Dec 16, 2025 at 04:25:37PM +0530, Nitin Jadhav wrote:
> it seems reasonable to align the checkpoint‑record‑missing case as well.
> The existing PANIC dates back to an era before online backups and archive
> recovery existed, when external manipulation of WAL was not expected and
> such conditions were treated as internal faults. With all such features, it
> is much more realistic for WAL segments to go missing due to operational
> issues, and such cases are often recoverable. So switching this to FATAL
> appears appropriate.
>
> Please share your thoughts.
FWIW, I think that we should lift the PANIC pattern in this case, at
least to be able to provide more tests around the manipulation of WAL
segments when triggering recovery, with or without a backup_label as
much as with or without a recovery/standby.signal defined in the tree.
The PANIC pattern to blow up the backend when missing a checkpoint
record at the beginning of recovery is a historical artifact of
4d14fe0048cf. The backend has evolved a lot since, particularly with
WAL archives that came much later than that. Lowering that to a FATAL
does not imply a loss of information, just the lack of a backtrace
that can be triggered depending on how one has set of a cluster to
start (say a recovery.signal was forgotten and pg_wal/ has no
contents, etc.). And IMO I doubt that a trace is really useful anyway
in this specific code path.
I'd love to hear the opinion of others on the matter, so if anybody
has comments, feel free.
I'd be curious to look at the amount of tests related to recovery
startup you have in mind anyway, Nitin.
--
Michael
