On Wed, Dec 3, 2025 at 6:07 PM Ignat Remizov <ignat980@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Thanks for looking, Ashutosh.
>
> pg_execute_server_program is sufficient for non‑superusers, but superusers
> always bypass it. In the incident that prompted this, the attacker obtained
> superuser via weak/default creds on an exposed instance (common in shared dev
> or staging setups). From there, COPY PROGRAM is the simplest, most common RCE
> vector used by botnets. The GUC is a defense‑in‑depth knob to let an admin
> disable that specific path even for superuser, while leaving the feature
> available by default for existing users.
>
> The patch just removes the lowest‑hanging RCE primitive when you explicitly
> turn it off (requiring a restart, not ALTER SYSTEM/SET). Default remains on to
> preserve current behavior.
>
Adding a feature which allows a system to run with compromisable
superuser credentials doesn't seem like something the community
usually accepts.
--
Best Wishes,
Ashutosh Bapat