Yeah, this is still on my list of things to research more about eventually - currently still unsolved.
For my use-case the NO RESET would need to apply until the end of the transaction, not end of the session.
I imagine something like an extension, that would: - block any SET SESSION ROLE - block any RESET ROLE - only allow SET LOCAL ROLE when CURRENT_USER has the right to do so
Then the effect of SET LOCAL ROLE would still be reversed at the end of the transaction, but you could never "escape" a SET LOCAL ROLE that was set earlier.
As things are now, would someone be able to do a RESET ROLE if *any* code/function had a SQL injection vulnerability, or only if there was one in the pooler? Or (ideally) neither. That's what a NO RESET option (or some similar functionality) would provide with certainty.
but haven't used it. Seems to address this though, they introduce a set_session_auth(token) function and then reset_role requires the token if session_auth has been set.
