On Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 9:31 AM Julien Rouhaud <rjuju123@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 9:21 AM Michael Paquier <michael@paquier.xyz> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jan 06, 2020 at 09:07:26AM +0100, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> > > This is a new bug in PG12. When you have a database with an OID above
> > > INT32_MAX (signed), then pg_basebackup fails thus:
> >
> > Yep. Introduced by 6b9e875.
>
> Indeed.
Yeah, clearly :/
> > > pg_basebackup: error: could not get write-ahead log end position from
> > > server: ERROR: value "3000000000" is out of range for type integer
> > >
> > > The cause appears to be commit 6b9e875f7286d8535bff7955e5aa3602e188e436.
> > >
> > > A possible fix is attached. An alternative to using OidInputFunctionCall()
> > > would be exporting something like oidin_subr().
> >
> > I think that you would save yourself from a lot of trouble if you do
> > the latter with a subroutine. Not quite like that based on the
> > process context where the call is done, but remember 21f428eb..
>
> +0.5 to avoid calling OidInputFunctionCall()
Or just directly using atol() instead of atoi()? Well maybe not
directly but in a small wrapper that verifies it's not bigger than an
unsigned?
Unlike in cases where we use oidin etc, we are dealing with data that
is "mostly trusted" here, aren't we? Meaning we could call atol() on
it, and throw an error if it overflows, and be done with it?
Subdirectories in the data directory aren't exactly "untrusted enduser
data"...
I agree with the feelings that calling OidInputFunctionCall() from
this context leaves me slightly irked.
--
Magnus Hagander
Me: https://www.hagander.net/
Work: https://www.redpill-linpro.com/
