Re: backup manifests - Mailing list pgsql-hackers
From | Robert Haas |
---|---|
Subject | Re: backup manifests |
Date | |
Msg-id | CA+Tgmob+xDcvEUTznkvianyJzKK8nUM6bWfkrnZQkL-XEa3NEA@mail.gmail.com Whole thread Raw |
In response to | Re: backup manifests (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
Responses |
Re: backup manifests
Re: backup manifests |
List | pgsql-hackers |
On Wed, Apr 1, 2020 at 4:47 PM Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: > Here's a new patch set. I haven't fixed the things in your latest > round of review comments yet, but I did rewrite the documentation for > pg_validatebackup, add documentation for the new pg_waldump option, > and add regression tests for the new WAL-checking facility of > pg_validatebackup. > > 0001 - add pg_waldump -q > 0002 - add checksum helpers > 0003 - core backup manifest patch, now with WAL verification included And here's another new patch set. After some experimentation, I was able to manually test the timeline-switch-during-a-base-backup case and found that it had bugs in both pg_validatebackup and the code I added to the backend's basebackup.c. So I fixed those. It would be nice to have automated tests, but you need a large database (so that backing it up takes non-trivial time) and a load on the primary (so that WAL is being replayed during the backup) and there's a race condition (because the backup has to not finish before the cascading standby learns that the upstream has been promoted), so I don't at present see a practical way to automate that. I did verify, in manual testing, that a problem with WAL files on either timeline caused a validation failure. I also verified that the LSNs at which the standby began replay and reached consistency matched what was stored in the manifest. I also implemented Noah's suggestion that we should write the backup manifest under a temporary name and then rename it afterward. Stephen's original complaint that you could end up with a backup that validates successfully even though we died before we got the WAL is, at this point, moot, because pg_validatebackup is now capable of noticing that the WAL is missing. Nevertheless, this seems like a nice belt-and-suspenders check. I was able to position the rename *after* we fsync() the backup directory, as well as after we get all of the WAL, so unless those steps complete you'll have backup_manifest.tmp rather than backup_manifest. It's true that, if we suffered an OS crash before the fsync() completed and lost some files or some file data, pg_validatebackup ought to fail anyway, but this way it is absolutely certain to fail, and to do so immediately. Likewise for a failure while fetching WAL that manages to leave the output directory behind. This version has also had a visit from the pgindent police. I think this responds to pretty much all of the complaints that I know about and upon which we have a reasonable degree of consensus. There are still some things that not everybody is happy about. In particular, Stephen and David are unhappy about using CRC-32C as the default algorithm, but Andres and Noah both think it's a reasonable choice, even if not as robust as everybody will want. As I agree, I'm going to stick with that choice. Also, there is still some debate about what the tool ought to be called. My previous suggestion to rename this from pg_validatebackup to pg_validatemanifest seems wrong now that WAL validation has been added; in fact, given that we now have two independent sanity checks on a backup, I'm going to argue that it would be reasonable to extend that by adding more kinds of backup validation, perhaps even including the permissions check that Andres suggested before. I don't plan to pursue that at present, though. There remains the idea of merging this with some other tool, but I still don't like that. On the one hand, it's been suggested that it could be merged into pg_checksums, but I think that is less appealing now that it seems to be growing into a general-purpose backup validation tool. It may do things that have nothing to do with checksums. On the other hand, it's been suggested that it ought to be called pg_validate and that pg_checksums ought to eventually be merged into it, but I don't think we have sufficient consensus here to commit the project to such a plan. Nobody responsible for the pg_checksums work has endorsed it, for example. Moreover, pg_checksums does things other than validation, such as enabling and disabling checksums. Therefore, I think it's unclear that such a plan would achieve a sufficient degree of consensus. For my part, I think this is a general issue that is not really this patch's problem to solve. We have had multiple discussions over the years about reducing the number of binaries that we ship. We could have a general binary called "pg" or similar and use subcommands: pg createdb, pg basebackup, pg validatebackup, etc. I think such an approach is worth considering, though it would certainly be an adjustment for everyone. Or we might do something else. But I don't want to deal with that in this patch. A couple of other minor suggestions have been made: (1) rejigger things to avoid message duplication related to launching external binaries, (2) maybe use appendShellString, and (3) change some details of error-reporting related to manifest parsing. I don't believe anyone views these as blockers; (1) and (2) are preexisting issues that this patch extends to one new case. Considering all the foregoing, I would like to go ahead and commit this stuff. -- Robert Haas EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company
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