On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 1:36 PM, David Fetter <david@fetter.org> wrote:
> On Fri, May 21, 2010 at 03:15:27PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
>> As long as you can't do database access except via SPI, that should
>> be covered. So I guess the next item on the list is no, or at least
>> restricted, access to functions outside the PL's own language.
>
> "No access" seems pretty draconian.
>
> How about limiting such access to functions of equal or lower
> trustedness? Surely an untrusted function shouldn't be restricted
> from calling other untrusted functions based on the language they're
> written in.
Agreed. As long as a trusted language can do things outside the
database only by going through a database and calling some function to
which the user has rights, in an untrusted language, that seems decent
to me. A user with permissions to launch_missiles() would have a
function in an untrusted language to do it, but there's no reason an
untrusted language shouldn't be able to say "SELECT
launch_missiles()".
--
Joshua Tolley / eggyknap
End Point Corporation
