Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Tom Lane
Subject Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
Date
Msg-id 6804.1266604249@sss.pgh.pa.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security  (Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com>)
Responses Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
List pgsql-hackers
Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@commandprompt.com> writes:
> Tom Lane wrote:
>> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary
>> user to blow away all settings for himself.  Even those that are for
>> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser.  Isn't
>> this a security hole?  I would expect that an unprivileged user should
>> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of
>> reverting to the installation-wide default.

> Yes, it is, but this is not a new hole.  This works just fine in 8.4
> too:

So I'd argue for changing it in 8.4 too.
        regards, tom lane


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