Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Antonin Houska
Subject Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
Date
Msg-id 53298.1566022566@antos
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
Responses Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
List pgsql-hackers
Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 09:01:05PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > * Bruce Momjian (bruce@momjian.us) wrote:
> > > Why would it not be simpler to have the cluster_passphrase_command run
> > > whatever command-line program it wants?  If you don't want to use a
> > > shell command, create an executable and call that.
> > 
> > Having direct integration with a KMS would certainly be valuable, and I
> > don't see a reason to deny users that option if someone would like to
> > spend time implementing it- in addition to a simpler mechanism such as a
> > passphrase command, which I believe is what was being suggested here.
> 
> OK,  I am just trying to see why we would not use the
> cluster_passphrase_command-like interface to do that.

One problem that occurs to me is that PG may need to send some sort of
credentials to the KMS. If it runs a separate process to execute the command,
it needs to pass those credentials to it. Whether it does so via parameters or
environment variables, both can be seen by other users.

-- 
Antonin Houska
Web: https://www.cybertec-postgresql.com



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