Stephen Frost wrote:
> * Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
>> This seems to me to be exactly parallel to deciding that SELinux should
>> control only table/column permissions within SQL; an approach that would
>> be enormously less controversial, less expensive, and more reliable than
>> what SEPostgres tries to do.
>
> While also ignoring a feature that is available, and used by these same
> security communities, in other enterprise RDBMSs...
>
> http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1743
>
> http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/sql/2005/multisec.mspx
>
> It's not codified in the SQL spec (yet..) that I saw, and maybe we could
> seperate out the SE bits from the row-level bits, but I'm really not
> sure I see the value in doing that..
They are separate. If you look at the patches you'll see a pgace part, this is
where the core interfaces to the security backends, and you'll see a rowacl
backend and an sepgsql backend.
Personally I'd like to see all of the access control moved out to use pgace,
including the standard DAC permissions but I doubt that would never happen.
