KaiGai Kohei wrote:
> Aidan Van Dyk wrote:
>> * Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> [080924 00:15]:
>>
>>> But I do think
>>> it's worthwhile to ask whether it makes sense to introduce a bunch of
>>> features that are only usable to people running SELinux.
>> Actually, I'ld go one stroke farther, and ask:
>> Does it make sense to introduce a bunch of features that are only
>> usable to people *able to write proper SELinux policy sets* (or whatever
>> they are called).
>
> It is incorrect.
>
> In the recent years, SELinux comunity aspires to becoming that end users
> can setup it without editing security policy. The default security policy
> contains many pre-defined object types and booleans, end user can select
> them, if needed.
>
> For example, the default security policy of SE-PostgreSQL provides several
> pre-defined object types, like sepgsql_table_t, sepgsql_secret_table_t,
> sepgsql_ro_table_t and sepgsql_fixed_table_t for table/column/tuple.
>
>>> it's very easy to imagine
>>> people wanting that feature, but NOT being willing to run SELinux to
>>> get it.
>> Or, being more generous even, able to *run* SELinux, but not able to
>> create a proper coherent set of SELinux policies... SELinux is
>> "standard" now on most RHEL installs (and FC, and now debian, etc), but
>> how many admins have actually "made" (or even just altered) a SELinux
>> policy, and how many have just disabled it because it prevented what
>> they thought should be a valid operation?
>
> Can you think the security policy is something like a pattern file of
> anti-virus software running on windows desktop? I allows end-users to
Sorry, s/I allows/It allows/g
> custamize some of options, but I have never seen a man who tries to
> make its pattern file by myself.
>
> Anyway, I don't think we can get a fruitful discussion like "how many
> users enables SELinux" here. Here is pgsql-hackers list.
>
> Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
