> What is "approved to contrib"?
>
> The problem here is that having reasonable certainty that a patch is
> not malicious requires having gone over it in some detail; at which
> point you might as well apply the thing. Or if you didn't apply it,
> you bounced it for reasons that are unlikely to have anything to do
> with needing more automated testing.
>
> ISTM this idea can only work if we have a "second tier" of reviewers
> who are considered good enough to vet patches as safe, but not quite
> good enough to certify them as commitable. I'm not seeing a large pool
> of people volunteering to hold that position --- at best it'd be a
> transitory state before attaining committerdom. If you are relying
> on a constant large influx of new people, you are doomed to failure
> (see "Ponzi scheme" for a counterexample).
Yep. For the record, Ponzi died in poverty, so it's not a counter
example, just proves that any gains that are had will be short lived and
increase the size of the crash when crunch time comes. :)
- Naz.
