Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Bernd Helmle
Subject Re: ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security
Date
Msg-id 32EF579BD16943AB19FB2C74@amenophis
Whole thread Raw
In response to ALTER ROLE/DATABASE RESET ALL versus security  (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>)
List pgsql-hackers

--On 13. November 2009 19:08:22 -0500 Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:

> It looks to me like the code in AlterSetting() will allow an ordinary
> user to blow away all settings for himself.  Even those that are for
> SUSET variables and were presumably set for him by a superuser.  Isn't
> this a security hole?  I would expect that an unprivileged user should
> not be able to change such settings, not even to the extent of
> reverting to the installation-wide default.

I agree. A quick check shows that resetting or changing a single parameter 
is not allowed, so this seems inconsistent anyways. Maybe AlterSetting() 
should be more strict and pick only those settings, which are safe for 
ordinary users to reset?

-- 
Thanks
Bernd


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