Greetings,
* Bruce Momjian (bruce@momjian.us) wrote:
> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 05:15:55PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > > We already discussed that there are too many other ways to break system
> > > integrity that are not encrypted/integrity-checked, e.g., changes to
> > > clog. Do you disagree?
> >
> > We had agreed that this wasn't something that was strictly required in
> > the first version and I continue to agree with that. On the other hand,
> > if we decide that we ultimately need to use an independent nonce and
> > further that we can make room in the special space for it, then it's
> > trivial to also include the tag and we absolutely should (or make it
> > optional to do so) in that case.
>
> Well, if we can't really say the data has integrity, what does the
> validation bytes accomplish? And if are going to encrypt everything
> that would allow integrity, we need to encrypt almost the entire file
> system.
I'm not following this logic. The primary data would be guaranteed to
be unchanged and there is absolutely value in that, even if the metadata
is not guaranteed to be unmolested. Security always comes with a lot of
tradeoffs. RLS doesn't prevent certain side-channel attacks but it
still is extremely useful in a great many cases.
Thanks,
Stephen
