Re: pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

From Kyotaro Horiguchi
Subject Re: pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)
Date
Msg-id 20210210.121344.243289801471383380.horikyota.ntt@gmail.com
Whole thread Raw
In response to pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)  (Ranier Vilela <ranier.vf@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)
List pgsql-hackers
At Tue, 9 Feb 2021 22:01:45 -0300, Ranier Vilela <ranier.vf@gmail.com> wrote in 
> Hi Hackers,
> 
> Per Coverity.
> 
> Coverity complaints about pg_cryptohash_final function.
> And I agree with Coverity, it's a bad design.
> Its allows this:
> 
> #define MY_RESULT_LENGTH 32
> 
> function pgtest(char * buffer, char * text) {
> pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
> uint8 digest[MY_RESULT_LENGTH];
> 
> ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(PG_SHA512);
> pg_cryptohash_init(ctx);
> pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (uint8 *) buffer, text);
> pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, digest); // <--  CID 1446240 (#1 of 1):
> Out-of-bounds access (OVERRUN)
> pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
> return
> }
>
> Attached has a patch with suggestions to make things better.

I'm not sure about the details, but it looks like broken.

make complains for inconsistent prototypes abd cryptohahs.c and sha1.c
doesn't seem to agree on its interface.

regards.

-- 
Kyotaro Horiguchi
NTT Open Source Software Center



pgsql-hackers by date:

Previous
From: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Date:
Subject: Re: Is Recovery actually paused?
Next
From: Kyotaro Horiguchi
Date:
Subject: Re: pg_cryptohash_final possible out-of-bounds access (per Coverity)