Peter,
* Peter Eisentraut (peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com) wrote:
> On 6/13/17 15:20, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > No, the benefit is that the database administrator can configure it and
> > set it up and not have to get an OS-level administrator involved. There
> > may also be other reasons why filesystem-level encryption is difficult
> > to set up or use in a certain environment, but this wouldn't depend on
> > anything OS-related and therefore could be done.
>
> Let's see a proposal in those terms then. How easy can you make it,
> compared to existing OS-level solutions, and will that justify the
> maintenance overhead?
From the original post on this thread, which included a WIP patch:
----------------------------------
Usage
=====
Set up database like so:
(read -sp "Postgres passphrase: " PGENCRYPTIONKEY; echo; export PGENCRYPTIONKEY initdb -k -K pgcrypto $PGDATA
)
Start PostgreSQL:
(read -sp "Postgres passphrase: " PGENCRYPTIONKEY; echo; export PGENCRYPTIONKEY postgres $PGDATA )
----------------------------------
That certainly seems very straight-forward to me, though I expect that
packagers would probably improve upon it further.
> Considering how ubiquitous file-system encryption is, I have my doubts
> that the trade-offs will come out right, but let's see.
There's definitely environments out there where DBAs aren't able to have
root privileges and that limits what they're able to do. I'm not really
sure how to objectively weigh "you don't need to be root to encrypt the
database" vs. maintenance overhead of this feature. Subjectively, for
my 2c anyway, it seems well worth it, but that's naturally subjective.
:)
Thanks!
Stephen
