On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 03:12:00PM -0400, Alvaro Herrera wrote:
>
> Excerpts from Robert Haas's message of lun jun 25 14:58:25 -0400 2012:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:49 PM, Alvaro Herrera
> > <alvherre@commandprompt.com> wrote:
> > > Excerpts from Robert Haas's message of lun jun 25 11:57:36 -0400 2012:
> > >> Really, I think
> > >> pg_upgrade needs this option too, unless we're going to kill the
> > >> problem at its root by providing a reliable way to enumerate database
> > >> names without first knowing the name one that you can connect to.
> > >
> > > I think pg_upgrade could do this one task by using a standalone backend
> > > instead of a full-blown postmaster. It should be easy enough ...
> >
> > Maybe, but it seems like baking even more hackery into a tool that's
> > already got too much hackery. It's also hard for pg_upgrade to know
> > things like - whether pg_hba.conf prohibits access to certain
> > users/databases/etc. or just requires the use of authentication
> > methods that happen to fail. From pg_upgrade's perspective, it would
> > be nice to have a flag that starts the server in some mode where
> > nobody but pg_upgrade can connect to it and all connections are
> > automatically allowed, but it's not exactly clear how to implement
> > "nobody but pg_upgrade can connect to it".
>
> Well, have it specify a private socket directory, listen only on that
> (not TCP), and bypass all pg_hba rules.
This could be added to the poststmaster -b behavior, but I am concerned
about the security of this. We sugest 'trust', but admins can adjust as
needed.
-- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB
http://enterprisedb.com
+ It's impossible for everything to be true. +
