Re: [HACKERS] SSL over Unix-domain sockets - Mailing list pgsql-patches

Tom Lane wrote:
> Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> writes:
> > I am confused because you say "dangling" then you say "to the real
> > socket".  You are saying it isn't dangling when the server is running?
>
> Exactly.  When the server is running it provides a perfectly good path
> to the postmaster.  The point (and the main difference from your PIDfile
> proposal) is that it's supposed to be there all the time, even when the
> postmaster isn't running.  This is what provides protection against the
> spoofer getting there first.

OK, I have added documention suggesting the creation a symbolic link in
/tmp to prevent server spoofing when the socket file has been moved.

I think we can consider this issue concluded.  I think SSL over unix
domain sockets has so much overhead as to be worse in most cases than
just creating the symlink.

Of course if someone comes up with a better idea we can reopen this.

--
  Bruce Momjian  <bruce@momjian.us>        http://momjian.us
  EnterpriseDB                             http://postgres.enterprisedb.com

  + If your life is a hard drive, Christ can be your backup. +
Index: doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvsroot/pgsql/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml,v
retrieving revision 1.403
diff -c -c -r1.403 runtime.sgml
*** doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml    24 Jan 2008 06:23:32 -0000    1.403
--- doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml    31 Jan 2008 17:21:57 -0000
***************
*** 1397,1403 ****
     connections is to use a Unix domain socket directory (<xref
     linkend="guc-unix-socket-directory">) that has write permission only
     for a trusted local user.  This prevents a malicious user from creating
!    their own socket file in that directory.  For TCP connections the server
     must accept only <literal>hostssl</> connections (<xref
     linkend="auth-pg-hba-conf">) and have SSL
     <filename>server.key</filename> (key) and
--- 1397,1412 ----
     connections is to use a Unix domain socket directory (<xref
     linkend="guc-unix-socket-directory">) that has write permission only
     for a trusted local user.  This prevents a malicious user from creating
!    their own socket file in that directory.  If you are concerned that
!    some applications might still look in <filename>/tmp</> for the
!    socket file and hence be vulnerable to spoofing, create a symbolic link
!    during operating system startup in <filename>/tmp</> that points to
!    the relocated socket file.  You also might need to modify your
!    <filename>/tmp</> cleanup script to preserve the symbolic link.
!   </para>
!
!   <para>
!    For TCP connections the server
     must accept only <literal>hostssl</> connections (<xref
     linkend="auth-pg-hba-conf">) and have SSL
     <filename>server.key</filename> (key) and