On Tue, 2010-10-05 at 12:27 -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> > On Tue, Oct 5, 2010 at 10:56 AM, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
> >> Personally I think this is a dead end that we shouldn't be wasting
> >> any more time on.
>
> > But you haven't proposed a reasonable alternative.
>
> Tom: "This problem is insoluble."
> Robert: "You can't claim that without offering a solution."
>
> Sorry ...
>
> > Option #1: Remove all mention from the documentation of using views
> > for security purposes. Don't allow views to have explicit permissions
> > attached to them; they are merely shorthand for a SELECT, for which
> > you either do or do not have privileges.
>
> The SQL standard requires us to attach permissions to views. The
> standard makes no claims whatsoever about how leak-proof views should
> be; it only says that you can't call a view without the appropriate
> permissions.
>
> I do think it's reasonable for the docs to point out that views that do
> row-filtering should not be presumed to be absolutely bulletproof.
> That doesn't make permissions on them useless, so you're attacking a
> straw man.
+1
JD
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