Re: BUG #18817: Security Bug Report: Plaintext Password Exposure in Logs - Mailing list pgsql-bugs

From Tom Lane
Subject Re: BUG #18817: Security Bug Report: Plaintext Password Exposure in Logs
Date
Msg-id 1241094.1739893072@sss.pgh.pa.us
Whole thread Raw
In response to Re: BUG #18817: Security Bug Report: Plaintext Password Exposure in Logs  (Indrajeeth Deshmukh <bkindrajeeth@gmail.com>)
Responses Re: BUG #18817: Security Bug Report: Plaintext Password Exposure in Logs
List pgsql-bugs
Indrajeeth Deshmukh <bkindrajeeth@gmail.com> writes:
> Thanks for sharing the details. It looks like a valid issue and has not
> been resolved yet. Currently, the solution is keeping the file remains
> secure, but when it comes to SIEM monitoring, it will be a major concern.
> Any thoughts on this?

The real bottom-line answer to that is that passwords are just the
tip of the iceberg.  The server log is likely to contain other
critical information depending on your application; consider credit
card numbers, HIPAA-protected medical details, etc.  The server
has no way at all to know which fields might be sensitive in that
way.  Even if we had some notion of which fields to hide, in cases
like statements with syntax errors, we couldn't reliably identify
which parts of a query string are sensitive.

The only solution is to treat the server log files with the same
amount of care as you give to the database files themselves.
Or send them to /dev/null, but that's unlikely to be very workable
in practice.

Independently of that, best practice is to never send cleartext
passwords to the server in the first place.  psql has support
for setting a password without that, and I think libpq does too.

            regards, tom lane



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