RE: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) - Mailing list pgsql-hackers

Dear Joe.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Joe Conway [mailto:mail@joeconway.com]
> Sent: Monday, June 18, 2018 9:30 PM
> To: Masahiko Sawada
> Cc: Moon, Insung; PostgreSQL-development
> Subject: Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
> 
> On 06/14/2018 12:19 PM, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 13, 2018 at 10:20 PM, Joe Conway <mail@joeconway.com> wrote:
> >> The idea has not been extensively fleshed out yet, but the thought
> >> was that we create column level POLICY, which would transparently
> >> apply some kind of transform on input and/or output. The transforms
> >> would presumably be expressions, which in turn could use functions
> >> (extension or builtin) to do their work. That would allow
> >> encryption/decryption, DLP (data loss prevention) schemes (masking,
> >> redacting), etc. to be applied based on the policies.
> >
> > Which does this design encrypt data on, buffer or both buffer and
> > disk?
> 
> 
> The point of the design is simply to provide a mechanism for input and output transformation, not to provide the
transform
> function itself.
> 
> How you use that transformation would be entirely up to you, but if you were providing an encryption transform on
input
> the data would be encrypted both buffer and disk.
> 
> > And does this design (per-column encryption) aim to satisfy something
> > specific security compliance?
> 
> 
> Again, entirely up to you and dependent on what type of transformation you provide. If, for example you provided
input
> encryption and output decryption based on some in memory session variable key, that would be essentially TDE and
would
> satisfy several common sets of compliance requirements.
> 
> 
> >> This, in and of itself, would not address key management. There is
> >> probably a separate need for some kind of built in key management --
> >> perhaps a flexible way to integrate with external systems such as
> >> Vault for example, or maybe something self contained, or perhaps both.
> >
> > I agree to have a flexible way in order to address different
> > requirements. I thought that having a GUC parameter to which we store
> > a shell command to get encryption key is enough but considering
> > integration with various key managements seamlessly I think that we
> > need to have APIs for key managements. (fetching key, storing key,
> > generating key etc)
> 
> 
> I don't like the idea of yet another path for arbitrary shell code execution. An API for extension code would be
preferable.

Thank you for your advice on key management.
In fact, it was a big worry how to implement key management.
Basically, we will look at the rules of KMIP, and I'll try to create an extension API that can mostly work with KMS.

and I have a question.
You said do not like the idea of another path for arbitrary shell code execution, is there any special reason?
For example, I think usability to specify a path for shell code to use several KMSs, Is there a potential security
issue?

Thank you and Best regards.
Moon.


> 
> 
> >> Or
> >> maybe key management is really tied into the separately discussed
> >> effort to create SQL VARIABLEs somehow.
> >
> > Could you elaborate on how key management is tied into SQL VARIABLEs?
> 
> Well, the key management probably is not, but the SQL VARIABLE might be where the key is stored for use.
> 
> Joe
> 
> --
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